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SATIATED ECONOMIES WITH UNBOUNDED CONSUMPTION SETS:
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This (preliminary) version: May 2, 2011
Abstract. For an exchange economy, under assumptions which did not bring about the ex-
istence of quasiequilibrium with dividends as yet, we prove the nonemptiness of the fuzzy re-
jective core. Then, via Konovalov (1998, 2005)’s equivalence result, we solve the equilibrium
(with dividends) existence problem. In a last section, we show the existence of a Walrasian
quasiequilibrium under a weak non-satiation condition which differs from the weak non-satiation
assumption introduced by Allouch–Le Van (2009). This result, designed for exchange economies
whose consumers’ utility functions are not assumed to be upper semicontinuous, complements
the one obtained by Martins-da-Rocha and Monteiro (2009).
JEL classification: D 50.
Keywords: Exchange economy; Satiation; Equilibrium with dividends; Rejective core; Fuzzy
rejective core; Core equivalence.
1. Introduction
In this note, we consider an exchange economy E = ((Xi, ui, ei)i∈I) defined on the commodity
space R`. Each of a finite set I of consumers has a consumption set Xi ⊂ R`, an initial endowment
ei ∈ R` and transitive and complete preferences onXi represented by a utility function ui : Xi → R.
We normalize utility functions by requiring for each i, ui(ei) = 0. As usual,
A(E) :=
{
x = (xi)i∈I ∈
∏
i∈I
Xi :
∑
i∈I
xi =
∑
i∈I
ei
}
denotes the set of all attainable allocations of the economy E . We let
AIR(E) = {x ∈ A(E), s.t. 0 ≤ ui(xi) ∀i ∈ I}
U = {v = (vi)i∈I ∈ RI : ∃x ∈ A(E), s.t. 0 ≤ vi ≤ ui(xi) ∀i ∈ I}
be respectively the set of all individually rational attainable allocations and the individually rational
utility set, sometimes called utility set. We will occasionally denote by Ai the projection on Xi of
AIR(E).
Definition 1.1. A couple (p, x) where 0 6= p ∈ R` and x = (xi)i∈I ∈ A(E) is a (Walrasian)
quasiequilibrium of E if for each i ∈ I,
p · xi = p · ei and ui(x′i) > ui(xi) =⇒ p · x′i ≥ p · ei.
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.35
2It is an equilibrium if ui(x′i) > ui(xi) actually implies p · x′i > p · ei
The possibility that the current assumptions do not imply local no-satiation of preferences at
each consumption component of equilibrium has motivated the following definition, going back to
different authors in different contexts, formalized with a different name by Mas-Colell (1992).
Definition 1.2. A couple (p, x) of a price p ∈ R` and of an attainable allocation x = (xi)i∈I ∈ A(E)
is a quasiequilibrium with dividends (slacks) if for each i ∈ I, there exists mi ∈ R+ such that
p · xi ≤ p · ei +mi and ui(x′i) > ui(xi) =⇒ p · x′i ≥ p · ei +mi.
It is an equilibrium (with dividends (mi)i∈I ) if ui(x′i) > ui(xi) actually implies p·x′i > p·ei+mi.
It is worth noticing that, in the previous definition, consumers are not anymore required to bind
their budget constraint at quasiequilibrium. If all dividends are not equal to 0, the fact that x
is an attainable allocation does not imply such an equality between quasiequilibrium expenditure
and revenue that only local non-satiation at quasiequilibrium could explain. Moreover, a null
equilibrium price is compatible with the previous definition. It simply implies that all consumers
are satiated at equilibrium.
On the other hand, let us now introduce the core notions which will allow to deduce the existence
of equilibria with dividends from the core equivalence theorem proved by Konovalov (2005).
Definition 1.3. A coalition S rejects an attainable allocation x ∈ A(E) if there exists a partition
S = S1 ∪ S2 and consumption bundles yi ∈ Xi, i ∈ S, such that
(a)
∑
i∈S yi =
∑
i∈S1 ei +
∑
i∈S2 xi,
(b) ui(yi) > ui(xi) ∀i ∈ S.
Following Aubin (1979), a non-null element t = (ti)i∈I of the set [0, 1]I is called a fuzzy
coalition. Its ith component is interpreted as the rate of participation of agent i in the fuzzy
coalition. Obviously, a coalition S ⊂ I can be seen as a fuzzy coalitions with rate of participations
equal to 0 or 1.
Definition 1.4. A fuzzy coalition t = (ti)i∈I rejects an attainable allocation x ∈ A(E) if there
exists t1, t2 in [0, 1]I and y ∈∏i∈I Xi such that t = t1 + t2 and
(a)
∑
i∈I tiyi =
∑
i∈I t
1
i ei +
∑
i∈I t
2
ixi,
(b) ui(yi) > ui(xi) ∀i : ti > 0.
Definition 1.5. An attainable allocation x ∈ A(E) is an element of the rejective core Cr(E)
(resp. is an element of the fuzzy rejective core Cfr (E)) if it cannot be rejected by a coalition
(resp. a fuzzy coalition). It is an element of the Edgeworth rejective core Cer (E) if it cannot be
rejected by a fuzzy coalition with rational rates ti, t1i , t
2
i of participation.
If, in definitions 1.3 and 1.4, S2 = 6© or if t2 = 0, the previous definitions coincide with the
standard definitions of blocking, so that Cr(E) ⊂ C(E), Cfr (E) ⊂ Cf (E), Cer (E) ⊂ Ce(E). It easily
follows from the definitions that an attainable allocation of the rejective core (resp. fuzzy rejective
core, Edgeworth rejective core) is individually rational, that is belongs to AIR(E). Moreover, if
satiation at all components of an attainable allocation is not ruled out, such an attainable allocation
is a trivial element of Cr(E) (resp. Cer (E), Cfr (E)). it is also a trivial equilibrium with dividends
allocation with any null or non-null equilibrium prices.
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3The main purpose of this note is to give sufficient assumptions on the economy E to guarantee
the non-emptiness of its fuzzy rejective core. In a last section, we will deduce from this result new
conditions for the existence of quasiequiliibrium with dividends in E .
2. The non-emptiness of the fuzzy rejective core
We will maintain on E the following assumptions.
A.1: For each i, Xi is convex, containing ei;
A.2: For each i, ui is strictly quasi-concave;
A.3: For each i, the set Pi(xi) := {yi ∈ Xi : ui(yi) > ui(xi)} is open in Xi at every attainable
and individually rational consumption vector.1
In addition, when consumption sets are not bounded below, a compactness assumption should
limit the arbitrage possibilities for consumers. We borrow this assumption from Martins-da-Rocha
and Monteiro (2009). Let us denote Si = argmax{ui(xi) : xi ∈ Xi} the set of satiation points of
ui on Xi.
Definition 2.1. The individually rational utility set U is strongly compact if for every sequence
xν in AIR(E) there exists an attainable allocation y ∈ A(E) and a subsequence xνk satisfying
(a) ∀i ∈ I, ui(yi) ≥ limk→∞ ui(xνki ),
(b) ∀i ∈ I, limk→∞ 1Si (x
νk
i )
1+‖xνki ‖
2 (yi − xνki ) = 0.2
As explained by Martins-da-Rocha and Monteiro, condition b. means that for the sequence xνki ,
only three cases can occur:
(1) the subsequence xνki is unbounded,
(2) the subsequence xνki converges to yi,
(3) for k large enough, xνki is not a satiation point.
The two following implications are proved in Martins-da-Rocha–Monteiro (2009) where are also
provided examples showing that the reverse implications are not true.
• If the utility functions ui are upper semicontinuous,3 compactness of AIR(E) implies the
strong compactness of U ,
• strong compactness of U implies its compactness.
It is well known that if U is compact, the economy E has a (strong) Pareto optimum4 which is also
individually rational. Strong compactness of U allows to prove the following sharper result to be
used later (see the discussion between Claim 2 and Claim 3 in the proof of Proposition 2.2). For
x ∈ AIR(E), let us define the following subset of U
U(x) =
{
v = (vi)i∈I ∈ RI : ∃x ∈ A(E), s.t. 0 ≤ vi ≤ ui(xi) ∀i ∈ I, xi = xi ∀i : xi ∈ Si ,and ui(xi) ≥ ui(xi) ∀i : xi /∈ Si
}
.
1As noticed several times in the literature, this assumption is not necessary if in A.2, the functions ui are
assumed to be concave.
2If A is a subset of R`, for z ∈ R`, 1A(z) is defined by 1A(z) = z if z ∈ A, 1A(z) = 0 otherwise.
3It is obvious that compactness properties of U subsume some upper semicontinuity properties of utility function.
When compactness of U is directly assumed, according to the results to be got, it may be not necessary to assume
in addition that utility functions are upper semicontinuous.
4That is, x∗ ∈ A(E) such that there is no y ∈ A(E) with ui(yi) ≥ ui(x∗i ) for each i ∈ I and ui0 (yi0 ) > ui0 (x∗i0 )
for some i0 ∈ I.
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4Proposition 2.1. Assume that U is nonempty and strongly compact. Then for x ∈ AIR(E), the
set U(x) has a maximal element.
Proof. it suffices to verify that U(x) is closed. Let vν a sequence of elements of U(x) converging
to v. There exists a sequence xν of elements of A(E) such that 0 ≤ vνi ≤ ui(xνi ) ∀i ∈ I and
xνi = xi ∀i : xi ∈ Si, ui(xνi ) ≥ ui(xi) ∀i : xi /∈ Si. By strong compactness of U , there existsa
subsequence xνk and y ∈ A(E) satisfying for all i ∈ I, ui(yi) ≥ limk→∞ ui(xνki ) and one of the
three properties above. As for i : xi ∈ Si, the cases (1) and (3) cannot occur for the sequence xνki ,
it then follows that yi = xi if xi ∈ Si and ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi) if xi /∈ Si, thus that v ∈ U(x).
From now on, we add to the assumptions A.1, A.2, A.3 on the economy E the following
compactness assumption.
A.4: U is strongly compact.
The next proposition is the main result of the note.
Proposition 2.2. Under Assumptions A.1, A.2, A.4, the economy E has a non-empty Edge-
worth rejective core Cfr (E). If we assume in addition A.3, E has a non-empty fuzzy rejective core.
Proof. As Le Van–Minh (2007), given some µ > 0 and δ = (δi)i∈I ∈ RI++, we associate to the
economy E , the economy
Ê = ((X̂i, ûi, êi)i∈I)
defined as follows. For each i ∈ I, X̂i = Xi × R+, êi = (ei, δi), and, for any (xi, di) ∈ X̂i,
ûi(xi, di) =
{
ui(xi) if, in E , xi /∈ Si
ui(xi) + µdi if, in E , xi ∈ Si
Without loss of generality, we can assume that no ei is satiation point of ui on Xi, so that
ûi(ei, δi) = 0.5 For the economy Ê , the sets A(Ê), AIR(Ê), Û are defined as in E . In particular,
Û = {v = (vi)i∈I : ∃(x, d) = (xi, di)i∈I ∈ A(Ê), s.t. 0 ≤ vi ≤ ûi(xi, di) ∀i ∈ I}.
The proposition will be proved through a sequence of claims. Two first claims will verify the
conditions, stated in Proposition 4.1 of Allouch–Florenzano (2004), for existence of Edgeworth
equilibria in Ê . Then, the following claims will show first that to an Edgeworth equilibrium of Ê
can be associated an element of the Edgeworth rejective core of E , then that, under Assumption
A.3, this element belongs to the fuzzy rejective core of E .
Claim 1. For each i, X̂i is convex, containing êi. Moreover, the function ûi is quasiconcave.
The claim is proved in Le Van–Minh (2007).
Claim 2. The set Û is compact.
Let (vν) =
(
(vνi )i∈I
)
be a sequence of elements of Û . By definition, there exists a sequence(
(xνi , d
ν
i )i∈I
)
of elements of AIR(Ê) such that
0 ≤ vνi ≤
{
ui(xνi ) + µd
ν
i if x
ν
i is a satiation point
ui(xνi ) if x
ν
i is not a satiation point
5A consumer who is satiated at ei does not play any role in the rejection process.
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5Using the strong compactness of U , there exists y = (yi)i∈I ∈ A(E)and, for each i ∈ I, subsequences
(xνki ) satisfying the conditions of Definition 2.1, together with subsequences (v
νk
i ) converging to
vi, (dνki ) converging to di ∈ R+ such that (yi, di)i∈I ∈ A(Ê).
Passing to limit in the above relation, distinguishing whether yi is or not a satiation point, and
observing that if yi is not a satiation point then for k large enough, xνki is not a satiation point,
we get for each i ∈ I
0 ≤ vi ≤
{
ui(yi) + µdi if yi is a satiation point
ui(yi) if yi is not a satiation point
so that 0 ≤ vi ≤ ûi(yi, di), which proves that v = (vi)i∈I ∈ Û .
In view of the previous claims, the economy Ê satisfies Assumptions A.1–A.3 of Theorem 3.1
in Allouch–Florenzano (2004), thus has an Edgeworth equilibrium (x, d).
At this stage, it is worthwhile noticing that in Ê , the set
P̂i(xi, di) =
{
Pi(xi)× R+ if xi /∈ Si
Si × {di ∈ R+ : di > di} otherwise
is not necessarily open in X̂i. We thus cannot infer from the previous conclusion that (x, d) belongs
to the fuzzy core of Ê . We now indicate how to circumvent this difficulty.
If, in view of Proposition 2.1, v∗ =
(
ui(x∗i )
)
i∈I is a maximal element of U(x), the reader will
verify that, in the economy Ê , ûi(x∗i , di) ≥ ûi(xi, di) ∀i ∈ I, and thus that (x∗, d) is likewise an
element of Ce(Ê). In what follows, we intend to show that x∗ = (x∗i )i∈I ∈ Cer (E), and assume from
now on, by way of contradiction, that there exists t1, t2 in ([0, 1] ∩Q)I and y ∈∏i∈I Xi such that
t = t1 + t2 6= 0 and
(a)
∑
i∈I tiyi =
∑
i∈I t
1
i ei +
∑
i∈I t
2
ix
∗
i ,
(b) ui(yi) > ui(x∗i ) ∀i : ti > 0.
Claim 3. x∗ ∈ Cer (E).
Setting, as Konovalov (2005), t2imax = maxi t
2
i , we will distinguish two cases.
Case1: t2imax = 0. In this case,
∑
i∈I tiyi =
∑
i∈I tiei and
∑
i∈I ti(yi, δi) =
∑
i∈I ti(ei, δi). As
ûi(yi, δi) > ûi(x∗i , di) ∀i : ti > 0, the coalition t blocks the allocation (x∗, d), which contradicts the
fact that (x∗, d) is an Edgeworth equilibrium of Ê .
Case 2: t2imax > 0. We first remark that, in this case, there exists i0 such that t
1
i0
> 0. In-
deed, if not, from
∑
i∈I t
2
i yi =
∑
i∈I t
2
ix
∗
i with ui(yi) > ui(x
∗
i ) ∀i : t2i > 0, we easily deduce:∑
i∈I t
2
imax
( t2i
t2imax
yi+
t2imax−t2i
t2imax
x∗i
)
=
∑
i∈I t
2
imaxei with if zi =
t2i
t2imax
yi+
t2imax−t2i
t2imax
x∗i , ui(zi) > ui(x
∗
i )
if t2i > 0, zi = x
∗
i if t
2
i = 0. As t
2
imax > 0 =⇒ z = (zi)i∈I ∈ A(E) and
(
ui(zi)
)
i∈I ∈ U(x), which
contradicts the definition of x∗.
In view of this remark, using ∑
i∈I
tiyi =
∑
i∈I
t1i ei +
∑
i∈I
t2ix
∗
i (2.1)
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6and
0 <
∑
i∈I
t1i δi +
∑
i∈I
t2i di (2.2)
we can choose for i ∈ S(x∗) di > di and rational τ2i such that∑
i∈S(x∗)
τ2i (di − di) =
∑
i∈I
t1i δi +
∑
i∈I
t2i di (2.3)
with 0 < τ2i < t
2
imax.
Let in Ê, the coalition τ defined with a slight abuse of language by
τ =
t
1
i + t
2
i if ti > 0
0 + τ2i if ti = 0 and i ∈ S(x∗)
0 + 0 if ti = 0 and i ∈ N(x∗)
and the allocation z = (zi)i∈I =
{
(yi, 0) ti > 0
(x∗i , di) ti = 0
.
It is easily verified that ∑
i∈I
τizi =
∑
i∈I
t1i (ei, δi) +
∑
i∈I
τ2i (x
∗
i , di) (2.4)
and that the coalition τ rejects with z the allocation (x∗, d).
From (2.4), we successively deduce:∑
i∈I
t1i zi +
∑
i∈I
τ2i zi +
∑
i∈I
(t2imax − τ2i )(x∗i , di) =
∑
i∈I
t1i (ei, δi) +
∑
i∈I
t2imax(x
∗
i , di) (2.5)
∑
i∈I
t1i (yi, 0) +
∑
i∈I
t2imax
( τ2i
t2imax
zi + (1− τ
2
i
t2imax
)(x∗i , di)
)
=
∑
i∈I
(t1i + t
2
imax)(ei, δi) (2.6)
Set
z′i =
τ2i
t2imax
zi + (1− τ
2
i
t2imax
)(x∗i , di),
z′′i =
t1i
t1i + t
2
imax
(yi, 0) +
t2imax
t1i + t
2
imax
z′i.
If ti = 0, using the monotonicity of ûi when x∗i ∈ Si and its quasi-concavity, we can rewrite z′i in
such a way that that ûi(z′i) > ûi(x
∗
i , di) and thus ûi(z
′′
i ) > ui(x
∗
i , di). When ti > 0, with t
2
i > 0, it
follows from the strict quasi-concavity of ûi, that ûi(z′i) > ûi(x
∗
i , di) and from the quasi-concavity of
ûi that ûi(z′′i ) > ûi(x
∗
i , di); if ti > 0 with t
2
i = 0, t
1
i > 0, then z
′
i = (x
∗
i , di), and ûi(z
′′
i ) > ûi(x
∗
i , di)
by strict quasi-concavity of ûi.
Summarizing, ∑
i∈I
t1i + t
2
imax∑
j∈J(t
1
j + t
2
imax)
z′′i =
∑
i∈I
t1i + t
2
imax∑
j∈J(t
1
j + t
2
imax)
(ei, δi)
with ûi(z′′i ) > ûi(x
∗
i , di) ∀i ∈ I, which contradicts (x∗, d) ∈ Ce(Ê). The proof of the first part of
Proposition 2.2 is now complete.
Claim 4. If we assume, in addition, A.3, x∗ ∈ Cfr (E).
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7In view of Assumption A.3, the proof is very similar to the one used for proving that, under
such a continuity assumption, an Edgeworth equilibrium of an economy is actually an element
of the fuzzy core. By way of contradiction, assume that x /∈ Cfr (E), thus that there exists t =
t1 + t2 ∈ [0, 1]I , t 6= 0 and x ∈∏i∈I Xi such that ∑i∈I tixi =∑i∈I t1i ei +∑i∈I t2ixi and ui(xi) >
ui(xi) ∀i ∈ supp t. In view of A.3, each Pi(xi) is open in Xi. Thus, let ε > 0 be such that
1 − ε < λ < 1 =⇒ λxi + (1 − λ)ei ∈ Pi(xi) and λxi + (1 − λ)xi ∈ Pi(xi) ∀i ∈ supp t. Let s =
s1+ s2 ∈ [0, 1]I be such that s1 ∈ QI , s2 ∈ QI , ti = 0 =⇒ si = 0 and t1i > 0 =⇒ 1− ε < t
1
i
s1i
< 1,
t2i > 0 =⇒ 1− ε < t
2
i
s2i
< 1. Set for each i ∈ supp t,
xsi =
1
s1i + s
2
i
[
s1i
( t1i
s1i
xi + (1− t
1
i
s1i
)ei
)
+ s2i
( t2i
s2i
xi + (1− t
2
i
s2i
)xi
)]
.
It is easily verified that
∑
i∈I(s
1
i +s
2
i )x
s
i =
∑
i∈I s
1
i ei+
∑
i∈I s
2
ixi and that x
s
i ∈ Pi(xi) ∀i ∈ supp s,
which contradicts x ∈ Cer (E) and completes the proof of the proposition.
Remark 2.2. To prove the last claim, one may replace A.3 by the following assumption:
A.3′: For each i ∈ I, the function ui is concave.
Indeed, for each i, it is known that, if ui(xi) > ui(xi), then there exists some point zi on the
segment joining ei and xi such that ui(zi) ≥ ui(xi). Then, using again the concavity of ui, the
proof above needs only some slight adjustments.
3. Decentralizing elements of the fuzzy rejective core
Proposition 3.1. Under Assumptions A.1 –A.4, let x ∈ Cfr (E). If N(x) 6= 6©, then there exists a
nonnull p ∈ R` such that (p, x) is a quasiequilibrium with dividends of the economy E. If N(x) = 6©,
x is trivially the allocation of a quasiequilibrium with dividends.
Proof. For sake of completeness of this paper, we repeat here the proof given by Konovalov (2005).
Let us consider the convex sets Gei = {yi− ei : yi ∈ Pi(xi)}, Gxi = {yi−xi : yi ∈ Pi(xi)} and define
G = co
⋃
i∈I
(Gei ∪Gxi ).
We first proof that 0 /∈ G. Indeed, if not, there exists for each ∈ I, t1i ≥ 0, t2i ≥ 0, and for each
i : t1i > 0, y
1
i ∈ Pi(xi), for each i : t2i > 0, y2i ∈ Pi(xi), such that
∑
i∈I(t
1
i + t
2
i ) = 1 and
0 =
∑
i∈I
t1i (y
1
i − ei) +
∑
i∈I
t2i (y
2
i − xi).
From this, one deduces:∑
i∈I
(t1i + t
2
i )
[ tiI1
t1i + t
2
i
y1i +
tiI
2
t1i + t
2
i
y2i
]
=
∑
i∈I
t1i ei +
∑
i∈I
t2ixi
which, in view of Assumption A.2, contradicts x ∈ Cfr (E).
Let us now assume thatN(x) 6= 6©. Then, G 6= 6© and there exist p 6= 0 such that p·g ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G.
From
yi ∈ Pi(xi) =⇒ [p · yi ≥ p · ei and p · yi ≥ p · xi],
setting for each i ∈ I, mi = max{0, p · xi − p · ei}, it is easily seen that (p, x) is a quasiequilibrium
with dividends.
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8If N(x) = 6©, setting for m = (mi)i∈I any element of RI+, (0, x) is a quasiequilibrium with
dividends. But for any p, (p, x) is also a quasiequilibrium with dividends, letting for each i ∈ I,
mi = max{0, p · xi − p · ei}.
Propositions 2.2 and 3.1 have as common consequence the following result which extends for an
exchange economy Theorem 3 in Le Van–Minh (2007).
Corollary 3.1. Under Assumptions A.1 – A.4, the economy E has a quasiequilibrium with div-
idends. If we assume in addition: ∀i ∈ I, ei ∈ intXi or under some condition of irreducibility of
the economy, this quasiequilibrium is actually an equilibrium with dividends.
Two last remarks are in order.
Remark 3.2. Given x∗ ∈ Cfr (E), it is possible to find p∗ 6= 0 such that (x∗, p∗) is a quasiequilibrium
with minimal dividends. Indeed, let S = {p ∈ R` : ‖p‖ = 1}. Recalling the proof of Proposition 3.1,
if the set G is nonempty, the nonempty set {p ∈ S : p · g ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G} is closed, thus compact, and
there exists p∗ which minimizes on this set the sum
∑
i∈I max{0, p · x∗i − p · ei}. If G = 6©, there
exists p∗ which minimizes on S the sum
∑
i∈I max{0, p · x∗i − p · ei}.
Remark 3.3. According to Definition 1.1, a (Walrasian) quasiequilibrium is a quasiequilibrium
with dividends (x∗, p∗) such that p∗ 6= 0 and all dividends m∗i are equal to 0. If for each i ∈ I,
x∗i /∈ Si, in view of the strict quasi-concavity of utility functions, both conditions are obviously
satisfied. Under stronger assumptions on the economy than the ones used in this paper, Allouch–
Le Van (2009) have stated a weaker nonsatiation condition for the existence of a (Walrasian)
quasiequilibrium. In the next section, we formulate a weak non-satiation assumption, sufficient for
quasiequilibrium existence, especially adapted to the exchange economies considered in this paper,
that is to economies where consumers’ utility functions are not assumed to be upper semicontinuous
on their consumption set.
4. Existence of (Walrasian) quasiequilibrium under a weak non-satiation
assumption
We still consider on E the assumptions A.1 – A.4, still assume without loss of generality that
for each i ∈ I, ei /∈ Si, and add:
A.5: For each consumer i ∈ I, if Si ∩ Ai 6= 6© then for all xi ∈ Si, λi(xi) := inf{λ >
0: ei + λ(xi − ei) ∈ Si} < 1.
Note that for each i, the set of satiated points Si is convex and would be closed if the utility
function ui was supposed to be uppersemicontinuous. Assumption A.5 is thus inconsistent with
any assumption of upper semicontinuity of consumers’ utility functions.
Let us define on Xi, the following utility functions:
ûi(xi, ) =
{
ui(xi) if xi /∈ Si
ui(xi) + e−d(ei,xi) if xi ∈ Si
and consider the economy Ê , obtained from E replacing by ûi the consumers’ utility functions ui.
For proving equilibrium existence in E , the strategy is different from the one used in Sections 2
and 3. We first establish the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core of Ê and thus the existence of a
(Walrasian) quasi-equilibrium for .Ê . The equilibrium existence for E will then follows from the
equilibrium existence for Ê .
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Proof. It is easily verified that the functions ûi : Xi → R are quasi-concave. We now prove that
the set
Û = {v = (vi)i∈I : ∃x = (xi)i∈I ∈ A(E), s.t. 0 ≤ vi ≤ ûi(xi) ∀i ∈ I}
is compact. Indeed let vν and xν ∈ A(E) be such that for each i ∈ I, ûi(ei) = ui(ei) ≤ vi ≤ ûi(xνi ).
Since U is strongly compact, there exist a subsequence xνk of xν and an allocation y ∈ A(E) such
that
∀i ∈ I, ui(yi) ≥ lim
k→∞
ui(xνki ) (4.1)
and one of the three cases stated in Definition 2.1 occur. From (4.1) and the definition of ûi, we
first deduce that for each i ∈ I, the sequence vνki converges to vi ≥ 0.
If yi /∈ Si, then for k large enough, xνki /∈ Si. Then, from (4.1) and from vνki ≤ ûi(xνki ) = ui(xνki ),
we deduce: vi ≤ ui(yi) = ûi(yi),
If yi ∈ Si, the third case may still occur. Then from (4.1), and from vνki ≤ ûi(xνki ) = ui(xνki ),
we deduce: vi ≤ ui(yi) ≤ ûi(yi) =, In the first case, we can assume without loss of generality
limk→∞ ‖xνki ‖ =∞, so that from (4.1) and from vνki ≤ ûi(xνki ) ≤ ui(xνki ) + e−d(ei,x
νk
i ), we deduce
vi ≤ ui(yi) ≤ ûi(yi). In the second case, the third one being excluded, we can assume without
loss of generality ûi(xνki ) = ui(x
νk
i ) + e
−d(ei,xνki ), so that by using (4.1) and passing to limit in the
relations vνki ≤ ûi(xνki ), we get vi ≤ ui(yi) + d(ei, yi) = ûi(yi). The proof of compactness of U is
thus complete.
In view of Theorem 3.1 in Allouch–Florenzano (2004), the economy Ê has an Edgeworth equi-
librium x = (xi)i∈I . We now prove that, under the assumption A.5, x is an element of the fuzzy
core of Ê . To see that, assume by contraposition that there exist t = (tI)I∈I ∈ [0, 1] \ {0} and
x ∈∏i∈I Xi such that ∑i∈I tixi =∑i∈I tiei and ûi(xi) > ûi(xi) ∀i ∈ supp t.
We first claim that there exists ε > 0 such that for each i ∈ I, 1−ε < λ < 1 =⇒ ûi
(
ei+λ(xi−
ei)
)
> ûi
(
xi
)
.
For each i ∈ I, several cases must be considered:
• If xi ∈ Si, from which it follows that xi ∈ Si and d(ei, xi) < d(ei, xi), it suffices to take
1− ε > λi(xi).
• If xi /∈ Si and xi ∈ Si, from which it follows that ui(xi) + e−d(ei,xi) > ui(xi), it suffices to
take 1− ε > λi(xi) to get for λ > 1− ε, ûi
(
ei + λ(xi − ei)
)
> ui(xi) + e−d(ei,xi) = ûi(xi).
• If xi /∈ Si and xi /∈ Si, from which it follows that ui(xi) > ui(xi), using A.3, it suffices to
take 1−ε such that for λ > 1−ε, ûi
(
ei+λ(xi−ei)
) ≥ ui(ei+λ(xi−ei)) > ui(xi) = ûi(xi).
We now classically define for each i ∈ I, si ∈ Q such that ti = 0 =⇒ si = 0 and ti > 0 =⇒ 1−ε <
ti
si
< 1 and xsi = ei+
ti
si
(xi− ei). If s = (si)i∈I , it is easily verified that
∑
i∈I six
s
i =
∑
i∈I siei and
ûi(xsi ) > ûi(xi ∀i ∈ supp s, which contradicts the assumption that x is an Edgeworth equilibrium
of Ê.
Proposition 4.2. Under the assumptions A.1 – A.5, the economy Ê has a quasiequilibrium.
Proof. Let x be the element of C(Ê) obtained in the previous proposition. As well known, if for
all i ∈ I, xi ∈ cl P̂i(xi), then there exists p ∈ R`, p 6= 0 such that (x, p) is a quasiequilibrium of
Ê . Recall that P̂i(xi) = {xi ∈ i : ûi(xi) > ûi(xi)}. If xi ∈ Si, the above condition follows from the
definition of ûi. If xi /∈ Si, the above condition follows from Assumption A.2 on ui.
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Corollary 4.1. Under the assumptions A.1 – A.5, the economy E has a quasiequilibrium.
If we assume in addition ∀i ∈ I, ei ∈ intXi or under some condition of irreducibility of the
economy, this quasiequilibrium is actually an equilibrium
Proof. A quasiequilibrium of Ê is obviously a quasieqilibrium of E . Proving the second part of the
statement of the corollary is standard.
Remark 4.2. The same remark as the one at the end of Section 2 is in order. In the previous
results, Assumption A.3 can be replaced by
A.3′: For each i ∈ I, the function ui is concave
and also by the weaker assumption borrowed from Bergstrom (1976)
A.3′′: For each i ∈ I, for each attainable and individually rational consumption vector xi, for
each xi ∈ Pi(xi), for each zi ∈ Xi, there is some λ, 0 < λ < 1, and xi+λ(zi−xi) ∈ Pi(xi).
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